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The Implications of Kumho Tire: Applying
Daubert Analysis to Warning-Label
Testimony in Products Liability Cases
SARA K. LEDFORD*
INTRODUCTION
The standard governing the admissibility of expert witness testimony has
undergone significant changes recently. It has become clear that the old common-law
standard, as set out in Frye v. United States,' has been replaced by a method
of analysis centered primarily on the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"). The
new standard, as set out by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.2 and clarified in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,3 has
illuminated the approach to be taken in the evaluation of the admissibility of all
expert witness testimony. However, this approach has primarily been developed in
scientific and technical expert areas, and many questions still exist regarding the
applicability and effectiveness of the standard as applied to social-science expert
testimony. The purpose of this Note is to explore the implications associated with
applying the new standard to social-science expert witness testimony. To explore
these implications, this Note will first set out the roots and development of the new
standard. Then, Part II of this Note will set out the development of the factors for
evaluating scientific and technical expert witness testimony. Part HI will apply the
new standard of analysis to an area of social science and illustrate the potential
problems that exist under such an analysis. This Note will demonstrate the analysis
and accompanying problems by applying the factors to potential testimony by an
expert testifying about the effectiveness of warning labels in products liability cases.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN
EXPERT-WITNESS-TESTIMONY STANDARD
The standard for admitting the testimony of expert witnesses has undergone several
changes in the past eighty years. There are four major steps in the chronology of
events that have led to the standard currently in force. First, the standard that was
used for most of the twentieth century was developed in Frye in 1923. Then the
FRE, as adopted in 1975,' set out a new standard for the admissibility of expert
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1998,
University of Michigan-Ann Arbor. I would like to thank my parents, Joel and Karen, and my
brother, Tim, for all the support and encouragement they have given me throughout my life.
I would also like to thank Professors Donald H. Gjerdingen and Aviva Orenstein for their
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1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4. Frye, 293 F. at 1014; see KENNETHR. FOSTER& PETERW. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE
11(1997).
5. ERICD. GREENETAL, FEDERALRULESOFEVIDENCE, at xii (Aspen Law & Bus. 1997).
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witness testimony.' The impact of the rules was not fully felt until the third step was
taken by the U.S. Supreme Court when it decided Daubert in 1993." The fourth step
in this chronology of events is Daubert's progeny. Of the cases following Daubert,
this Note will focus primarily on Kumho Tire. This Part will show the development
of each of these steps and attempt to illustrate the impact of each step on the standard
for the admissibility of expert witness testimony.
A. Frye v. United States
The Frye case developed the standard that is the starting point of this Note's
analysis. Frye involved the use of a systolic blood pressure deception test, a
predecessor to the modem lie detector test,8 in a criminal case.9 Defense counsel
wanted to call the scientist who administered the deception test to the defendant as
an expert witness at trial."0 The trial court did not allow it, and the issue was appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." In theirbrief, defense counsel
argued that "'[w]hen the question involved does not lie within the range of common
experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special
knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or
trade to which the question relates are admissible in evidence."" 2 Although this may
be true as a general principle, the court went a bit further in holding that "while courts
will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs."' 3 This is what became known as the Frye general acceptance test.
Under the Frye general acceptance test much deference was given to the judgment
of the relevant scientific community, thereby allowing trial judges to avoid many of
the difficulties and complexities associated with determining the admissibility of
scientific expert evidence. 4 As with most judicially created tests, the general
acceptance test was not without problems. One significant problem involved the
admissibility of new evidence that had not yet been published. 5 Lack of publication
meant that the evidence had not yet had an opportunity to gain acceptance by the
relevant scientific community. 6
6. FED. R. EVID. 702-705.
7. See Judge Harvey Brown, Eight GatesforExpert Witnesses, 36 HOus. L. REv. 743,780
(1999).
8. FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 225.
9. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
10. Id. at 1014.
11. Id. at 1013-14.
12. Id. at 1014.
13. Id.
14. Brown, supra note 7, at 778-79.
15. ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON & RITA J. SIMON, THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE DATA IN
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 23 (1998).
16. Id.; Brown, supra note 7, at 779.
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B. The Federal Rules of Evidence
The next major event in the development of the current expert witness standard was
the adoption of the FRE, which were enacted into law in 1975.17 FRE 702 through
705 govern the use of expert witness testimony. The rule that is of most importance
in this analysis of expert witness testimony is Rule 702, as it is the one that has
received the majority of the Supreme Court's attention.' 8 Rule 702 states: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise."' 9 Despite the fact that the enacted rules
contained provisions governing the admissibility of expert witness testimony, the
Frye general acceptance test continued to be the primary test used in federal courts.2"
The expert witness provisions in the rules did not become significant until the
Supreme Court decided Daubert in 1993.21
C. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
The third stage inthe development ofthe current expert-witness-testimony standard
was the Supreme Court's decision in Daubert.' InDaubert, theparents of two minor
children were suing Merrell Dow, the manufacturer of the drug Bendictin.1 The
parents alleged their children's birth defects had been caused by the respective
mothers' use of the drug during their pregnancies.24 The defendant moved for
summary judgment and submitted an affidavit from an expert in support of its
position.2" The expert stated that he conducted an extensive literature review
regarding Bendictin and birth defects and that not one of the over thirty studies he
reviewed found the drug to cause birth defects.26 The plaintiffs responded to the
motion for summary judgment by offering evidence, which purported to show that
Bendictin could cause birth defects, from eight of their own experts.27 The various
methodologies used by the plaintiffs' eight experts ranged from test tube and live
animal studies to pharmacological studies and reanalysis of existing epidemiological
studies.28 Although the FRE pertaining to expert witnesses were already in force,29
the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on the
17. GREEN ET AL, supra note 5, at xii.
18. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
19. FED. R. EvID. 702.
20. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585; FOSTER &HUBER, supra note 4, at 11.
21. Brown, supra note 7, at 779-80.
22. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
23. Id. at 582.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 583.
28. Id.
29. See GREEN ET AL., supra note 5, at xii.
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Frye general acceptance test.3" According to the district court, scientific evidence was
only admissible when it was "'sufficiently established to have general acceptance in
the field to which it belongs."' 3' Applying this principle, the district court concluded
that any expert opinion that was not based on epidemiological evidence was
inadmissible."
In affirming the district court's decision to grant summary judgment for Merrell
Dow, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also relied on the Frye general acceptance
test.33 The court of appeals stated that scientific evidence was not admissible "unless
the technique is 'generally accepted' as reliable in the relevant scientific
community."34 The court of appeals took particular issue with the reanalysis of the
epidemiological studies.35 The court's primary concern was that the reanalyses had
not been published nor subjected to any other kind of peer review.36 The plaintiffs
appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari."'
The argument the petitioners presented before the Supreme Court took issue with
the validity of the Frye general acceptance test.38 The central tenet of their argument
was that the Frye test had been superseded by the FRE.39 The Court agreed with the
petitioners' argument 0 and stated "[n]othing in the text of... Rule [702] establishes
'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility."'" In addition to the
fact that the text of the rule does not take into account the Frye general acceptance
test, the Court also noted that the legislative history was devoid of any reference to
that test.42 The Court went on to state that "[g]iven the Rules' permissive backdrop
and their inclusion of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention
'general acceptance,' the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is
unconvincing. '43 Based on this, the Court concluded that the Frye general acceptance
test should not be the primary test used in federal courts to determine the
admissibility of expert testimony. 4
However, the Court was quick to point out that because that test was no longer the
standard did not mean there were no standards to use as guidance in determining the
30. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 583.
31. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal.
1989)).
32. Id. at 583-84.
33. Id. at 584.
34. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir.
1991)).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 585.
38. Id. at 587.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 588.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 589.
44. Id. The general acceptance test is no longer the standard used to determine the
admissibility of expert witness testimony but is one of the several factors that may be
considered under the Daubert analysis. See discussion infra Part II.D.
[Vol. 76:465
THE IMPLICATIONS OF KUMHO TIRE
admissibilityofscientific evidence.45' "To the contrary, under the Rules thetrialjudge
must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only
relevant, but reliable."' The Court based this conclusion primarily on Rule 702 and
the two requirements it identified as flowing from that rule.47 The first requirement
the Court viewed Rule 702 to establish was one of evidentiary reliability.4 The Court
felt that the phrase "scientific knowledge" indicates both that the evidence has "a
grounding in the methods and procedures of science" and "connotes more than
subjective belief or unsupported speculation." 9 The second requirement established
by Rule 702 was that of relevance.50 "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility."'"
Having considered the requirements of Rule 702, the Court established a new
standard for the evaluation of expert scientific evidence. Under the new standard,
"the trial judge must determine ... whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a
fact in issue."'52 Clearly, this standard involves a two-pronged analysis that the trial
judge must undertake.5" First, the judge must determine whether the methodology that
serves as the foundation for the testimony is sound.5 4 Then, the trial judge must
determine if that methodology can be appropriately applied to the facts of the
particular case at hand.55
The Court then proceeded to set out several factors that can be useful in performing
this two-pronged analysis.56 The first factor the Court discussed was whether the
particular evidence being offered can be tested.' The primary concern the Court
identified here was falsification.5" The possibility that evidence could be falsified,
even if it has not, is an indication of the reliability of the evidence. The second factor
the Court enumerated was "whether the theory or technique has been subjected to
peer review and publication."59 The Court stated that the idea behind this factor was
that by undergoing this process there is a chance that the problems or errors that exist
in the methodology will be discovered.'" Evidence that has successfully survived this
process has another indicator of reliability supporting it. However, the Court made
45. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 589-91.
48. Id. at 590.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 591.
51. Id. at 591-92.
52. Id. at 592.
53. Id. at 592-93.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 593.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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it clear that this is not an absolute requirement for admissibihty.6 1 Part of the Court's
logic behind this result was that new theories that are scientifically sound may not yet
be published, and this lack of publication may not indicate unreliability, but rather
newness.
62
The third factor that the Court said may be taken into consideration was the error
rate and the existence of standards relating to the procedures and operation of any
given scientific technique or principle.63 The final factor the Court gave was the
general acceptance of the principle or technique.' The Court envisioned the role of
the general acceptance test as follows: "A 'reliability assessment does not require,
although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and
an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that
community.'
65
The Court was careful to stress that this Rule 702 inquiry is flexible with the focus
on relevance and reliability as indicators of scientific validity.' The Court also
emphasized the fact that this analysis focuses only on the manner in which the
evidentiary conclusions are generated, not on the conclusions themselves.67 In
essence, the Court held that general acceptance is not an absolute requirement for the
admissibility of scientific evidence, but the trial judge now has the responsibility to
ensure that the expert scientific evidence is reliable and relevant to the case at bar.6
The Ninth Circuit, on remand, added one more factor to this basic list of factors. 9
This factor asks whether the research was conducted independent of the litigation or
was prepared solely for the purposes of testifying in a particular case.7"
The Court's opinion in Daubert only discusses scientific expert evidence.7'
However, in addition to scientific knowledge, Rule 702 includes technical and other
specialized knowledge.72 This apparent inconsistency led many to question whether
the Daubert analysis applied to experts other than scientific experts. This dilemma
was resolved in the Kumho Tire decision.73
D. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael
In Kumho Tire, the Court considered "how Daubert applies to the testimony of
engineers and other experts who are not scientists."'74 The case arose out of an
accident that occurred when a tire on the respondents' minivan blew out and caused
61. Id. at 594.
62. Id. at 593.
63. Id. at 594.
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 595.
68. Id. at 597.
69. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
70. Id. at 1317.
71. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8.
72. FED. R. EviD. 702.
73. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
74. Id. at 141.
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an accident killing one passenger and injuring several others.'5 The respondents
brought suit alleging that the tire, manufactured and distributed by the petitioners,
whs defective.'6 The main support for the respondents' case was based heavily on the
testimony of a tire-failure-analysis expert. 7
The Court was called upon to decide if the Daubert analysis applied to the tire-
failure expert's testimony." In arriving at the conclusion that the Daubert analysis
applies to all expert witness testimony,7 the Court used the following logic. First, the
language of Rule 702 "makes no relevant distinction between 'scientific' knowledge
and 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge. It makes clear that any such
knowledge might become the subject of expert testimony."' The Court then pointed
out that the word "knowledge" establishes the notion of reliability in Daubert, not the
word "scientific."'" Thus, the reliability requirement carries over to technical
knowledge and other specialized knowledge. It further clarified the point that the
reason the Daubert opinion only refers to scientific expert testimony is because that
was the type of expert testimony at issue in that case.82 The Court then pointed out
that there is no clear division between scientific expert evidence and technical or
otherwise specialized expert evidence, so it would be exceedingly difficult forjudges
to apply the expert witness rules if they had to make such a distinction prior to the
application of the FRE."3 For these reasons, the Court concluded that the Daubert
analysis applies to all types of potential expert witness testimony."'
The Court then turned to the application of the Daubert analysis to engineering-
type evidence. The Court found that the four factors mentioned in Daubert may be
useful in determining whether the evidence is admissible."5 This serves to reinforce
the notion that the Daubert analysis is flexible in nature and that judges should adapt
their analysis to the particular type of expert testimony offered in any particular
case.86 As the Court noted, the reliability of an expert's testimony may depend on a
solid scientific foundation in some situations but may depend on personal knowledge
or experience in other situations.' Given the wide range of potential topics of expert
witness testimony, it was impossible for the Court to enumerate a completely
definitive set of factors that should be considered when determining the admissibility
of expert witness testimony.8 The key "is to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
75. Id. at 142.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 146.
79. Id. at 147.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 147-48.
83. Id. at 148.
84. Id. at 149.
85. Id. at 150.
86. See id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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expert in the relevant field."89
Following this logic, the Court concluded that the district court had properly
conducted a Rule 702 analysis." The expert had testified that "in the absence of
evidence of abuse, a defect will normally have caused a tire's separation."'" He went
on to contend that ff there were fewer than two of the four total signs of abuse, then
the tire was defective.92 This, in and of itself, was not the problem. However, when
coupled with uncertainties about the effectiveness of the expert's method of
inspection and certain inconsistencies in the expert's conclusions regarding the
degree of abuse necessary to conclude that something other than the defect had
caused the problem, the Court decided that the expert's testimony was properly
excluded.93
Although the Kumho Tire decision has resolved the issue regarding whether the
Daubert analysis applies to all expert testimony, some questions remain. One issue
is the development of factors judges will use in evaluating the various types of expert
evidence. A second issue is how these factors, which to this point have primarilybeen
developed in conjunction with scientific and technical expert testimony,94 apply to
social-science-type expert evidence. The remaining parts of this Note discuss these
two issues.
1. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DAUBERT-TYPE FACTORS
In its opinion in the Daubert case, the Supreme Court enumerated four factors that
may be used to evaluate whether scientific expert witness testimony is reliable and
relevant and therefore admissible.9 As mentioned earlier, these factors are the ability
to be tested or falsified, peer review and publication, error rate and standards, and
general acceptance of the principle or technique.' The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, when deciding the case on remand,9 7 added a fifth factor to this list. The
factor added by the court of appeals takes into consideration whether the expert's
opinion was developed independently of the litigation or strictly with the intent to
testify as an expert.9" This Part seeks to set out a more in-depth explanation of the
development and application of these five primary factors than has been descnbed
above. A more detailed understanding of these factors is required before setting up
the application of these factors to the hypothetical situation of a warning-label expert
witness's testimony later in this Note.
89. Id. at 152.
90. Id. at 153.
91. Id. at 154.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 154-56.
94. The Daubert case involved medical testimony and other types of hard-science
testimony, see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and the Kumho Tire
case involved engineering-type testimony, see Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 140.
95. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 52-60.
97. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
98. Id. at 1317.
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A. Testing and Falsification
The first factor the Supreme Court discussed in Daubert was whether the scientific
theory or technique can be tested.99 The primary concern of this factor is whether the
purported scientific theory is falsifiable.' ° The Court then cited several authorities
on the nature of science that supported the notion that the ability to test a hypothesis
or theory is one of the features that uniquely identifies scientific principles. 10'
Essentially, "a statement or theory is... falsifiable if and only if there exists at least
one potential falsifier-at least one possible basic statement that conflicts with it
logically."'02 The logic behind this factor is that although a particular hypothesis may
not ever be proven true to a certainty, the hypothesis is more reliable the more often
it is tested and is able to weather the storm. °3
If this logic is followed, one arrives at the conclusion that scientific endeavors
should be designed with the goal of falsifying hypotheses or theories as opposed to
proving them.'"° Underlying this conclusion is the notion that scientific results that
are at odds with established or accepted principles are more useful.0 5 This type of
result provides new information, as opposed to a scientific experiment with results
thatjust confirma previously accepted theory. 6 This line of'reasoning appears to be
at odds with the Court's desired result-evidentiary reliability-because it places
more value on the contradictory results. However, the underlying principle does
support the Court's intended result. The reliabilityofa scientific theory or conclusion
that is being offered into evidence by an expert is greater if that theory has been
subjected to testing and has withstood the attack. This is not to say that the theory is
reliable eternally. As new scientific discoveries are made, a new line of attack may
eventually find weaknesses in the theory, but at that moment in time, the testing
record provides the trial judge with one mechanism for measuring the reliability of
the proffered evidence.
Despite the advantages in terms of evidentiary reliability, investigating all the
various studies and tests that have attempted to falsify a particular theory could prove
99. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
100. Id.
101. Id. The quotes the Court used are as follows: "'Scientific methodology today is based
on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified; indeed, this
methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human inquiry."' Id. (quoting
E~icD. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 645
(1983)). "'[Ihe statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical
test."' Id. (quoting CARL G. HEMPEL, PHsOSOPHY OFNATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966)). "'[T]he
criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."'
Id. (quoting KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFuTATiONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989)).
102. 1999 WILEY EXPERT WITNESS UPDATE 77 (Eric Pierson ed., Aspen Law & Bus. 1999)
(quoting Karl R. Popper, Realism, and the Aim of Science, in 11E POSTSCRIPT TO THE LOGIC
OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY (W. Bartley III ed., 1983)).
103. FOSTER& HUBER, supra note 4, at 38.
104. Id. at 42.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 42,44.
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to be an arduous task for a trial judge. One wayto begin this potentially daunting task
is for the trial judge to examine the null hypothesis.' 7 This is a way to ensure that the
expert positing the theory took at least the minimum attempt to falsify his or her
hypothesis.08 The contention that there is a significant difference between the treated
and the untreated control group can be understood as falsification of the opposite of
the originally proposed theory."°
B. Error Rate
Another factor discussed by the Supreme Court in Daubert was the rate of error."'
The Supreme Court, in Daubert, includes in its description of this factor both the
consideration oftherate of error and the existence of standards that regulate or control
the operation of a particular scientific mechanism."' The application of this factor to
determine the admissibility of expert testimony involves several different issues for
the trial judge to examine. First, there are multiple types of errors that can, and do,
occur during scientific research."' The trial judge must be prepared to assess the
effect of all these different types of errors."' The next thing the judge must consider
is the existence of standards that govern particular experimental processes and
mechanisms and the nature of the enforcement of those very standards, ifthey exist."'
The multitude of errors that can occur in a scientific research endeavor can, and do,
occur throughout every stage of the research process for a variety of reasons." 5 One
type of errorthat occurs is random error."6 This is generally the least problematic type
of error to consider for scientists and judges alike, because this type of error tends to
balance out over the course of many repetitions of an experiment or procedure." 7 As
long as a sufficient number of trials or repetitions are undertaken, this type of error
should not affect the reliability of the results. In most situations, this would seem to
be a relatively simple inquiry for a trial judge to make regarding the reliability of the
particular scientific evidence at issue.
A more troublesome type of error is systematic error."' Systematic errors may
include problems with the parameters or boundaries of the experiment such that the
mechanism consistently over-reports false instances or under-reports true instances
107. See id. at 49. The null hypothesis is "the assertion that the treated and untreated groups
in an experiment do not differ significantly with respect to some characteristic under scrutiny."
Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
111. See id.
112. See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 4, at 72.
113. Seeid. at70.
114. See, e.g., id. at 100-01 (discussing use of good laboratory and clinical practices to
ensure integrity of scientific data).
115. See id. at 70, 72.
116. Id. at 70.
117. Id.
118. Id. Systematic errors are defined as those that "are the same for every measurement, or
are a function of the value of the quantity being observed." Id.
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of the variable being measured," 9 sampling error,' or data manipulation.' These
types of errors can be more difficult to detect. If the problem lies in the design of the
mechanism or experiment, it may be particularly hard for a trial judge to detect this
type of systematic error, especially if the procedures involved are highly specialized
and technical. It may also be difficult to detect certain types of data manipulation."
For example, ajudge or even another scientist can examine the reported results of any
given experiment but cannot know what, if anything, was excluded from the report."n
Data manipulation may be of particular concern in the area of expert witness
testimony because of the pressures that are brought to bear on the expert witness due
to the advocate's role in the American legal system.2 There is one tool that can be
utilized in assessing this area of error-the existence of standards governing the
technique or the field of science in general.'I If such standards exist, an evaluation
of the reliability of the results of the scientific inquiry can be made based on whether
the expert complied with those standards. Another relatively easy indicator for the trial
judge to determine is whether the particular expert has considered and evaluated the
potential sources of error in the scientific results and conclusions that are being
offered as testimony. 6 "A scientist's failure or unwillingness to directly confront
potential errors in his or her own work is almost conclusive proof, in and ofitself, that
the work is flawed."' 7
C. Peer Review and Publication
A third factor the trial judge considers when determining the reliability of the
potential expert witness testimony is whether the basis of the testimony offered by the
expert "has been subject to peer review and has been published."'2 The logic behind
the Supreme Court's inclusion of this factor is that peer review increases the
probability that problems or errors that may be present in the research process or the
ultimate results will be discovered.' The Court is quick to point out, however, that
publication (which it views as an element of the peer-review process) 3° is not an
absolute requirement for the admissibility of evidence, because this may exclude
scientifically solid theories that are too new to have made it through the publication
process yet.'' In some ways this factor is connected to whether a theory or
proposition being offeredby the expert can be tested. While peerreview does not and
cannot prove to a certainty that the theory is true, it does provide a record of the
119. Id. at76.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 95-96.
122. Id. at 96, 100.
123. Id. at 100.
124. Id. at 101-02.
125. Id. at 100-01.
126. See id. at 83.
127. Id.
128. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharrn., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 593-94.
131. Id. at 593.
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instances in which the theory has been tested.' What the peer-review system does
provide is a method of "ensur[ing] a threshold level of reliability for published
scientific reports."' This level of reliability flows from the fact that the theory has
been tested and has subsequently passed the test."'
While this minimum level of reliability is relatively easy for a trial judge to gauge,
there are some problems within the system that are not as easily ascertainable. This
process is a good mechanism for eliminating the scientific papers that are seriously
flawed or clearly erroneous, but it can be easy for a reviewer to miss the subtler, less
obvious problems.'35 There are several reasons for this. First, the reviewers often do
not have the opportunity to see the original data-they are confined to reviewing only
what was submitted.'36 This not only prevents the reviewer from seeing what data was
left out regarding data manipulation, but also keeps him or her from double-checking
the calculations and statistical analysis.'37 Another factor contributing to the inability
to detect less than obvious problems is that the multiplicity of scientific journals in
existence allows the author of a paper to cruise the journal circuit, making slight
modifications and perhaps covering up problems, until the article is accepted by a
journal.'
The problems with the peer-review system emphasize the fact that, while a survey
ofpeer-reviewed publications regarding a particular theory orproposition is relatively
easy for a trial judge to do, it is important to remember that in most scientific debates
it will most likely be possible to find a few peer-reviewed articles that support the
underdog theory."" For this reason and the fact that new or very narrow theories may
not have been published yet, it is important that the judge not place a disproportionate
amount of emphasis on the peer-review factor.
D. General Acceptance Test
As the fourth enumerated factor in Daubert, the Supreme Court stated that the Frye
general acceptance test could yet be of some use:' "Widespread acceptance can be
an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and 'a known technique
which has been able to attract only minimal support within the community,' may
properly be viewed with skepticism."'' However, the Court was quick to qualify this
statement by stating that an exacting analysis of this sort is not required when
determining the reliability of evidence.'42
Given the continued, yet somewhat less prominent, viability of the general
acceptance test, a more in-depth discussion of this factor is necessary. The test
132. FOSTER&HUBER, supra note 4, at 163.
133. Id. at 180.
134. Id. at 163.
135. Id. at 171.
136. Id. at 171,174.
137. Id. at 174.
138. Id. at 175.
139. See id. at 175 (citation omitted).
140. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
141. Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
142. Id.
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consists of a two-pronged analysis. 4 ' First, the relevant scientific community must be
identified.'" Then, the level of acceptance within that community of the methodology
in question must be assessed.4" This test does have its problems, though, which have
led some to the conclusion that it is unreliable.'" The primary concern is that as the
relevant scientific communitybecomes increasingly specific, more and more evidence
will be excluded until only the most widely accepted, mainstream theories remain.'47
It seems a fair assumption to conclude that the Supreme Court recognized this in
Daubert and thus made it one of several potentially relevant factors for determining
reliability, rather than the exclusive test. By requiring that the analysis include
multiple factors that a trial judge can balance, the tendency of the general acceptance
test to exclude new and unique scientific evidence can be offset, provided that the new
evidence's reliability is demonstrated in some other manner.
E. Independence of Research from the Litigation
The fifth primary factor of the Daubert analysis was not actually identified by the
Supreme Court but was implemented by the Ninth Circuit in deciding the case on
remand. 4 ' As the Ninth Circuit put it, "One very significant fact to be considered is
whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and
directly out ofresearch they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether
they have developed their opinions expressly for purposes of testifying."'49 In a way,
this ties into the earlier discussion about data manipulation. Findings based on
research that was conducted independently of the litigation at hand provide an
indication of reliability in that the expert will not have as much room or motivation to
manipulate the data to support the position of the client."s
On a related note, conducting the research before there is the possibility of
testifying as an expert witness will reduce the possibility that the expert will,
consciously or unconsciously, bias the results of the research in favor of the result
expectedbythe client and the attorney." The independent nature of the research also
limits the attorney's ability to "shop" for an expert that will support her theory of the
case. There will be a finite number of experts that are doing research in the particular
field in question, and only a limited number of which, if any, will support the position
taken by the attorney no matter whether she is representing the plaintiff or
defendant. 2 This logic led Judge Kozinski, in writing for the Ninth Circuit, to
conclude that this factor is the most critical in determining that the proffered scientific
143. Barbara Frederick, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Method or
Madness?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 237, 251 (1994).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharrm, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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evidence is good, reliable science and not junk science.'
Ill. WARNrNG LABELS AS AN EXAMPLE OF SOCIAL-SCIENCE TESTIMONY
In keeping with the spirit of the Kumho Tire decision, which extended the
application of the Daubert analysis to all expert witness testimony, this Part applies
that analysis to an area ofsocial-science expert testimony. The first section of this Part
will apply the five primary Daubert factors discussed above to the hypothetical
testimony of an expert witness testifying in a products liability case regarding the duty
to warn and, more specifically, about the effectiveness of warning labels. The second
section of this Part will analyze any problems that arise in the application of the five
primary factors to the warning-label expert's testimony and propose new factors that
may be more useful to determine the admissibility of a social-science expert's
testimony, specifically the hypothetical warning-label expert, in the flexible analysis
envisioned by Daubert and its progeny. Before either of these steps can be taken, a
brief discussion of modem products liability law and the role of warning labels is in
order to better understand the nature of expert testimony in this area and the role it
plays.
A. Products Liability and Warning Labels
The primary logic behind the law of products liability is to compensate for the
losses caused by defective products." The basic tenet stated by the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability is: "One engaged in the business of selling or
otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective product is subject
to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect."'55 The next logical
question is: What is a defective product? The Restatement defines several categories
of defective products.' 56 For the purposes of this Note, only one category, as defined
by the Restatement, is important and is defined as follows:
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate
instructions or warnings. A product:
(C) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the
omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe.'7
The logic behind classifying inadequate instructions or warnings as aproduct defect
153. Id. at 1317-18.
154. ALVIN S. WEINSTEIN ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE REASONABLY SAFE
PRODUCT 4 (1978).
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 1 (1997).
156. See id. § 2.
157. Id.
[Vol. 76:465
THE IMPLICATIONS OF KUMHO TIRE
is that "the danger level of the product can be substantially reduced by carefully
worded warnings and instructions on product use and the possible consequences of
misuse.'.. This Note does not purport to be a detailed analysis of the interaction
between the duty to warn and warning labels on products. For the purposes of this
Note, it is sufficient to state that the adequacy and effectiveness, or reasonableness,
of the warnings is one factor that may be at issue in a products liability case and
therefore may be the subject of expert witness testimony.59
Generally, to be considered adequate, a warning label must fulfill the following
functions (or some combination thereof): w identify the hazard and potential injury,
identify the intensity of the hazard, supply information that illustrates how to avoid
the hazard, and clearly communicate these factors."" There are a number of factors
that play a part in determining if a warning label is adequate. Some general categories
of factors that play a role in determining the adequacy of a warning label include: the
intensity of the warning," the placement of the warning on the product, the use of
pictures or symbols,'" the selection of a signal word,'65 the color," and the clarity of
the language used in the warning.67 Accordingly, this broad range of factors provides
a wide range ofpotential topics for expert testimony. Based on the intended functions
of a warning label and the factors that are involved in determining if those functions
have been adequately served, it is possible to see that there is a certain subjectivity
158. WEINSTEIN ETAL, supra note 154, at 40.
159. Note, however, that even if a warning label is adequate it may not relieve the
manufacturer or distributor of liability if a relatively simple design change could have
decreased or eliminated the likelihood of harm. Alvin S. Weinstein, Consensus Standardsfor
Warning Labels: Prescriptive but Not Protective, in PRODUCT LIABIITYl WARNINGS,
INSTRUCTIONS, AND RECALLS 1984, at 153, 156-57 (1984) [hereinafter PRODUCT LIABIITY
WARNINGS].
160. Kenneth Ross, Creating the Warning Label System and Meeting the Duty to Instruct,
in PRODUCT LAnuaTy WARNINGS, supra note 159, at 119, 121; Weinstein, supra note 159, at
160. As would be expected, there is not complete consensus on the elements or functions of
an adequate warning label.
161. Ross, supra note 160, at 121; Weinstein, supra note 159, at 160.
162. Barbara Wrubel, Liability for Failure to Warn or Instruct, in PRODUCT LIABILrrY
WARNINGS, supra note 159, at 9, 40 ("[A] warning may be deemed inadequate if it is not
sufficiently intense; that is, if the language of the warning is not commensurate with the gravity
of the harm likely to result from the danger." (citing Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973))); see also Ross, supra note 160, at 121.
163. Wrubel, supra note 162, at 42; see also Ross, supra note 160, at 121.
164. Ross, supra note 160, at 121.
165. Weinstein, supra note 159, at 162. There are three general classifications of signal
words that roughly correlate to the intensity of the harm. In order from most intense to least,
the generally recognized signal words are danger, warning, and caution. Id.; see also Ross,
supra note 160, at 125.
166. Ross, supra note 160, at 125. There is also a continuum of color correlated to the
intensity ofwaming, with the most intense being red, which is followed by orange, and finally
yellow. Id.
167. Id. at 121. The factors mentioned above will be explained in further detail as they are
used in the following hypothetical reliability analysis of a warning-label expert's testimony.
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involved in the creation and evaluation of warning labels. 168 Most likely, this
subjectivity will be reflected in any testimony offered by expert witnesses regarding
warning labels and may create difficulties in applying the Daubert reliability analysis
to expert testimony. Testimony regarding warning labels would clearly not be
classified as being based on a hard science or technical field. The most likely
discipline for this type of testimony to be based on is psychology, as it involves
attracting users' attention to the label and then getting them to comprehend the danger
that is being warned against.
B. Applying the Five Primary Daubert Factors to Warning Labels
Having briefly set out relevant considerations, the focus of this Note now shifts
to applying the five primary Daubert factors to warning-label expert witness
testimony. The first of these is whether the theory can be tested or falsified. The
analysis under this factor will be highly dependent upon the methodology used by the
expert in conducting his or her research. The most likely methodology used by a
warning-label expert would involve creating several warning labels that varied with
respect only to a single characteristic and then gauging peoples' reactions to the
various labels.
For example, one could gauge the reactions of groups of people to a "red danger"
label as opposed to an "orange danger" label. 69 Then, if more people paid attention
to the red label, but the defendant in a product liability case had used an orange label,
the expert could then testify about the likelihood of preventing the accident if a red
label had been used instead. One indicator the trial judge could use to access the
reliability of the offered testimony is the null hypothesis. In the red-orange color
example, evaluating a "danger" label that did not use any color, but was only black
and white would test the null hypothesis. As stated earlier, this would be an indication
as to whether the expert attempted to falsify his or her own theory. In this regard, the
use of this indicator does not vary significantly from the evaluation of hard-science
evidence to the evaluation of social-science evidence. Also, as with scientific
evidence, the trial judge will be able to assess whether anyone has tested the theory.
Whether anyone else has tested the theory is, of course, related to the second
Daubert factor, peer review and publication. Clearly, if the results have not been
published it is unlikely, though not impossible, that anyone else would have tested the
theory. The problem posed by this factor is where does the trial judge look for
publications. Obviously, social-science journals and publications do exist. However,
it seems highly unlikely that psychology journals would publish any significant
number of studies on the effectiveness of warning labels; such studies only being of
use to manufacturers who probably do not read psychologyjournals. Taking this into
consideration, the next logical place to look for published studies on warning labels
would be trade and industry publications. However, it may then become necessary to
take into consideration the source of the publication. Surely, the studies that are
168. Weinstein, supra note 159, at 161.
169. The term "red danger" label refers to a warning label with the signal word "danger" that
has a red background behind the word. Similarly, an "orange danger" label would have an
orange background behind the signal word.
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published in trade and industry publications are biased somewhat in favor of the
audience that they serve-the industries-and may not receive the same critical type
ofpeer review prior to publication that occurs in more academically oriented journals.
This may not be all bad, though, because surely the industries themselves are
interested in using adequate warning labels so as to limit their potential liability.
However, it does add another degree of uncertainty regarding expert testimony that
is being evaluated based on these publications. Thus, peer review might not be a good
factor to consider in the determination of the admissibility of expert witness testimony
regarding types of testimony that tend not to be published in academic journals.
Accepting the assumption that the most likely place for a study on warning labels
to be published is a trade or industry publication leads potentially to another problem.
This problem is that persons within the specific field probably publish most of these
studies. It seems that within a particular field, those most likely to write an article on
warning labels would be those whose jobs bring them into contact with warning
labels. This would most likelybe the person who develops the warning labels or heads
the department that is charged with such development, if one exists. The implication
of these facts is that the only people writing these articles are likely to be the very
people that would serve as expert witnesses for the manufacturers of the allegedly
defective product. Although this concern does not necessarily speak to the reliability
of the testimony offered by a particular defendant's expert, it does bring up the
question as to whether a plaintiff will be able to find a warning-label expert whose
testimony will be reliable enough to be admissible under the Daubert analysis.
The utility of the third Daubert factor, error rate and standards, could also be
affected by the fact that most of the people involved in the study of warning labels are
associated with the industry that produces the products that need such warnings. This
association gives rise to a possible motive for the manipulation of data. Since the
potential authors of these studies know the preferences of their target audience this
mayhave an impact, even unintentionally, on the results they derive from the research.
There is potential for data manipulation and error in a more general manner also.
Psychological and other social-science research studies often require the active,
cognizant participation of human beings, unlike many science experiments that are
strictly laboratory-based studies of physical elements or even medical research that
involves determining whether someone has a disease or gene. 70 Much more often in
the social-science realm, the researcher must deal with and account for the thought
processes of the human subjects he or she is studying. Careless phrasing of questions,
for example, can inadvertently introduce an element of error into the information
gathered by the researcher.""
Assume, for example, that a researcher is giving a survey about the effectiveness
of particular warning labels. The survey first asks a series of questions about colors
and symbols used on particular labels and then asks about the intensity of danger
associated with a label that uses red as a background color and a large lightning bolt
as a symbol. If not composed carefully, the first series of questions may alert, even if
only subconsciously, the research subjects as to the answer the researcher is looking
170. See BERNARD PHILIPS, SoCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH METHODS 13 (1985).
171. See CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAw 7 (2d ed. 1994).
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for regarding the final question.77 This would introduce an element of error into the
study that may not be easily detectable by the trial judge seeking to determine the
reliability of the theory based on this research. This type of error will not show up in
the statistical calculation.
Part ofthe potential data manipulation and error effect is controlled by the existence
of standards. Two types of standards are important here. First, just as there is with
scientific research, there are certain guidelines social-science researchers are to follow
when conducting their experiments. In a reliability analysis, these standards operate
in the exact same way that the scientific procedural standards do. The trial judge will
discern whetherthe relevant standards and procedures were followed, and iftheywere
not, then the judge knows to be skeptical of the reliability of the theory being
proffered as evidence (or at least the judge knows to look for other factors that
indicate reliability under the Daubert standard).
The second set of standards that play a role are the standards established for
warning labels themselves by the various industry associations. Although merely
complying with the minimum standards may not be enough to allow the manufacturer
to avoid liability, the standards do provide the judge with one way of assessing the
reliability of an expert's proffered testimony by providing a measuring stick to
compare against the expert's testimony. If an expert is attempting to argue that a
warning label that is far below industry standards was in fact adequate, his testimony
may not necessarily be unreliable, but it would be an indication to the judge to at least
look for other factors indicating the reliability of the evidence. When it is looked at
in this manner, this set of standards can actually be seen as an indication of the general
acceptance of the methodology, which was the Supreme Court's fourth factor in the
analysis.
The fifth factor, whether the research has been conducted independent of the
litigation, creates some problems in the context of warning labels. The primary
concern is related to the fact discussed earlier that the only people likely to be
publishing on the subject of warning labels are those within a particular industry that
regularly work with warning labels. In addition to presenting several concerns in the
context of peer review and publication, this scenario also presents some concerns in
the context of independence from the litigation. One point to consider is whether the
experts that are likely to testify are those that work with the development and
implementation of warning labels in a particular industry; if that is the case, the
question is whether the research on which they base their testimony can ever be
viewed as independent of the litigation. Although the experts would not have done any
of their research with the intent of testifying in a particular case, the essence of their
work is to prepare warning labels in such a manner that they will be deemed adequate
in any particular lawsuit that may arise. Therefore, courts must consider whether it is
enough to guarantee reliability by showing that the research was not done in
preparation for anyparticular lawsuit or whether the testimony offered by such experts
will be deemed inadmissible because of the general context in which it was developed.
172. PHILUPS, supra note 170, at 234 ("[I]t is important to understand that initial questions
convey to the respondent information which he uses to assess the purposes of the study.").
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CONCLUSION
Although the warning-label quagmire discussed above is a hypothetical scenario it
demonstrates the difficulties a trial judge may face in applying a Daubert analysis to
any academic discipline that shares similar characteristics. The mere possibility that
this situation may rear its ugly head illustrates that the Daubert analysis is yet another
drain on the increasingly limited resources of the judiciary because it requires judges
to engage in an ever-changing analysis of expert testimony.
That is not to say that the Daubert standard does not have its benefits; it clearly
does. The flexibility it allows in determining reliability, and ultimately admissibility,
is critical. As expert testimony becomes more and more commonplace in even the
most basic kinds of litigation and the range of topics that are the basis of such expert
testimony continues to expand, the possibility of fairly evaluating each and every type
of expert testimony with a single, static test becomes more and more unrealistic.
Although this flexibility is the Daubert approach's largest benefit, it is also its
biggest drawback. As the variety of types of experts called upon to testify increases,
the job of the trial judge will become increasingly difficult. The trial judge will have
to be able to evaluate more and more types of research methodologies. If the judge is
called upon to do this alone in each and every case, the already time-consuming
process of a trial, whether civil or criminal, will get even longer.
Most would agree that elongating this already drawn out process is not in the best
interest of the judicial system, from both the bench's perspective and the litigant's
perspective. It puts a further drain on already limited judicial resources, as well as
impeding the speedy resolution of litigants' claims. The dilemma this creates is how
to retain the flexibility needed to fairly evaluate a wide array of expert witness
testimony while not overly burdening the judicial system.
The best compromise seems to be the use of an independent panel of experts to
evaluate proffered testimony and report their conclusions to the trial judge. This panel
could operate in a manner similar to that ofjudicial clerks, except that at least for the
time being, one panel should be able to serve a group of judges rather than an
individual judge. The panel could also be composed of several experts with varying
backgrounds and areas of expertise. For example, there could be a social scientist, an
engineer, and a medical doctor. Thus, one of the expert advisors would have at least
a minimum degree of familiarity with any given type of expert testimony and
accordingly should be able to perform a reliability analysis using the Daubert factors
more quickly than a judge who would have to start from scratch. This method would
allow the individual type of analysis necessary to accurately determine the reliability
of a wide range of topics of expert testimony, while also minimizing the effort the
judge must exert and keeping any delay attributable to the process as minimal as
possible.
2001]

